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Abstract
Behaviourism is the view that preferences, beliefs, and other mental states in social-
scientific theories are nothing but constructs re-describing people’s behaviour.
Mentalism is the view that they capture real phenomena, on a par with the unobserv-
ables in science, such as electrons and electromagnetic fields. While behaviourism
has gone out of fashion in psychology, it remains influential in economics, espe-
cially in ‘revealed preference’ theory. We defend mentalism in economics, construed
as a positive science, and show that it fits best scientific practice. We distinguish
mentalism from, and reject, the radical neuroeconomic view that behaviour should
be explained in terms of brain processes, as distinct from mental states.
Keywords: Mentalism, behaviourism, revealed preference, decision theory,
scientific realism.
1 Introduction
Economic theory seeks to explain the social and economic behaviour of individual
human agents (and sometimes that of other agents, such as firms). It usually does
so by (i) ascribing, at least in an ‘as if’ mode, certain mental states, such as beliefs and
preferences, to the agents in question and (ii) showing that, under the assumption that
those agents are rational, the ascribed mental states lead us to predict, and thereby to
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make sense of, the behaviour to be explained.1 For example, we explain why Franz went
to buy a cappuccino at Starbucks, instead of staying in his o ce, by saying that he had
a preference to drink co↵ee, and a belief that there was co↵ee at Starbucks but not in
the o ce, so that it was rational for him to take the action. Standard economic theory
formalizes this explanation by representing Franz’s preferences in terms of an ordering
or utility function over outcomes and his beliefs in terms of a subjective probability func-
tion over states of the world; an action is then deemed ‘rational’ (at least in the simplest
case) if it maximizes expected utility. Setting aside technicalities, the logic underlying
this explanation is very similar to the logic underlying folk-psychological reasoning with
its ascription of beliefs and desires to explain behaviour. Economic decision theory can
thus be seen as a more sophisticated and scientific reconstruction of folk psychology.2
But what is the status of the ascribed mental states, as formalized by objects such as
preference orderings, utility functions, and subjective probability functions? Are they
(1) mere re-descriptions of behavioural patterns and perhaps instrumentally useful
constructs for organizing and making sense of empirical regularities,
or are they
(2) representations of real mental or psychological phenomena, no less existent in the
world than the (also not directly observable) electrons, neutrinos, and electromag-
netic fields postulated in the natural sciences?
Roughly, behaviourism is the first of these two views, whereas mentalism is the second;
we will make this more precise later.
Behaviourism used to be the dominant view across the behavioural sciences, includ-
ing not only economics, where it was pioneered by scholars such as Vilfredo Pareto
(1848-1923), Paul Samuelson (1915-2009), and Milton Friedman (1912-2006), but also
psychology and linguistics, where it was prominently expressed, for example, by Ivan
Pavlov (1849-1936), Leonard Bloomfield (1887-1949), and B. F. Skinner (1904-1990).
Bloomfield (quoted in Langendoen 1998) wrote:
1We focus on micro-economic theory, which is based on decision- and game-theoretic models. For
an overview of theories of choice and rationalization, see Bossert and Suzumura (2010). Non-human
agents to which micro-economic theory is sometimes applied include corporate agents (see, e.g., List and
Pettit 2011) and non-human animals (see, e.g., a special issue on group decision making in humans and
animals, edited, with introduction, by Conradt and List 2009).
2Decision theory thereby exemplies a familiar feature of science more generally, which Quine described
as commonsense gone self-conscious (Quine 1960). As Lewis (1983: 114) puts it: ‘[Decision theory] is a
systematic exposition of the consequences of certain well-chosen platitudes about belief, desire, prefer-
ence, and choice. It is the very core of our common-sense theory of persons, dissected out and elegantly
systematized.’ On decision theory’s relation to folk psychology, see also Pettit (1991) and Mongin (2011).
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‘The terminology in which at present we try to speak of human a↵airs –
[...] “consciousness”, “mind”, “perception”, “ideas”, and so on – [...] will be
discarded [...] Non-linguists [...] forget that a speaker is making noise, and
credit him, instead, with the possession of impalpable “ideas”. It remains for
the linguist to show [...] that the speaker has no “ideas” and that the noise
is su cient.’
In psychology and linguistics, especially since Noam Chomsky’s influential critique (1959)
of Skinner, behaviourism has long been replaced by some versions of mentalism (e.g.,
Katz 1964; Fodor 1975), though often under di↵erent names, such as ‘cognitivism’ or
‘rationalism’. Many forms of behaviour, it is now widely accepted, are hard to explain
unless we pay attention to the cognitive mechanisms underlying them. Chomsky ar-
gued that the way in which children learn languages would be di cult to explain if
we thought of children as mere stimulus-response systems, without any innate language
processing capacities (Pinker 1994; cf. Tomasello 1995). For instance, children’s gram-
matical mistakes do not fit a random trial-and-error pattern; there are certain kinds of
combinatorially possible mistakes that children hardly ever make.
In economics, unlike in those other sciences, behaviourism continues to be influen-
tial and, in some subfields, even the dominant orthodoxy.3 The ‘revealed preference’
paradigm, in many of its forms, is behaviouristic, though there are more and less radi-
cal versions of it, as we will explain in detail later. Recently, Faruk Gul and Wolfgang
Pesendorfer (2008) have o↵ered a passionate defence of what they call a ‘mindless eco-
nomics’, a particularly radical form of behaviourism.
In this paper, we aim to clear up some common confusions about behaviourism and
mentalism in economics, situate the debate in the broader context of the philosophy of
science, and defend a mentalist approach to economics, which we argue is in line with
best scientific practice. We thereby reject Gul and Pesendorfer’s case for behaviourism,
though we do so from a di↵erent, more philosophy-of-science-oriented perspective than
earlier responses to them, which often invoked either normative or neuroeconomic argu-
ments (see, e.g., Ko˝szegi and Rabin 2007; Harrison 2008; and Caplin and Schotter’s 2008
collection; some of our criticisms are shared by Hausman 2008). We show that a case
for mentalism can be made even if economics is treated as a purely positive science of
socio-economic behaviour and not as any sort of normative enterprise. We briefly review
3Behaviourism should not be conflated with behaviourial economics, which emphasizes the need for
economic models to incorporate insights from psychology (e.g., Camerer et al. 2004). Arguably, the name
‘behaviourial economics’ is slightly misleading; ‘psychological economics’ would be more appropriate.
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some other responses to behaviourism at the end of this paper.4
We agree with one methodological concern voiced by Gul and Pesendorfer: the con-
cern about the appropriate level of explanation in economics. Here, we think, Gul and
Pesendorfer are right in criticizing the attempts of the most radical neuroeconomists to
reduce decision theory to neuroscience. But Gul and Pesendorfer draw the wrong con-
clusions from this. Far from supporting a ‘mindless economics’, rejecting the attempt
to reduce economics to neuroscience is entirely consistent with accepting a mentalist
appproach to economic theory. The failure to recognize this point may stem from a
failure to distinguish clearly between the notions of ‘mind’ and ‘brain’. The former is a
‘higher-level’, psychological notion, the latter a ‘lower-level’, physiological one. The most
compelling forms of mentalism entail precisely the view that the study of rationality and
action cannot be reduced to the neuro-physiological study of the brain and body.
The paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, we review and contextualize Gul
and Pesendorfer’s claims. In Section 3, we identify four misconceptions underlying them.
In Section 4, we introduce some key concepts from the philosophy of science, which help
us clarify the di↵erence between behaviourism and mentalism. In Section 5, we distin-
guish between two kinds of ‘revealed preference’ approaches to economic theory – an
‘epistemological’ and an ‘ontological’ one – and show that only the more radical and less
plausible approach commits us to behaviourism. In Section 6, we state our argument
for mentalism more positively. In Section 7, we argue that the di↵erence between men-
talism and behaviourism is not just a metaphysical matter but relevant to the practice
of economics. In Section 8, we distinguish mentalism from, and argue against, the radi-
cal neuroeconomic view that socio-economic behaviour should be explained in terms of
agents’ brain processes, as distinct from their mental states. In Section 9, we conclude.
4The parallels between the mentalism-behaviourism debate in psychology and the one in economics
have received relatively little attention in the literature. For a brief historical discussion, unrelated to
Gul and Pesendorfer, see Edwards (2008). In a manuscript that came to our attention after we completed
the first version of this paper, Okasha (forthcoming) discusses how the contrast between mentalistic and
behaviouristic interpretations of decision theory interacts with that between positive and normative uses
of decision theory. He argues – in line with our conclusions here – that when decision theory is used
as a positive, explanatory theory, there are good reasons to adopt a mentalistic interpretation. More
provocatively from our perspective, he argues that when decision theory is used as a normative theory
(to prescribe how choices should be made), a behaviouristic interpretation is appropriate. For an earlier
discussion of the merits and demerits of di↵erent interpretations of decision theory, see Bermudez (2009).
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2 The case for mindless economics
Gul and Pesendorfer’s paper, ‘The case for mindless economics’ (2008), provides a useful
starting point for our discussion. The paper makes at least three claims about economic
science (i.e., the positive rather than normative part of economics):
• The only evidence that should be used to test economic theories is evidence about
people’s choice behaviour.
• The content of any economic theory consists solely in its choice-behavioural im-
plications; two theories that are choice-behaviourally equivalent should be seen as
equivalent simpliciter.
• Any economic theory should take the form of a representation of choice behaviour,
and that representation should ideally take the form of attributing to the agents
the maximization of some objective function.
The first of these claims concerns the evidential base of a theory in economics, the second
its semantic content or meaning, and the third the methodology of theory construction.
In addition to making these positive claims, Gul and Pesendorfer also express scepticism
towards any form of normative economics that goes beyond a very thin kind of ‘revealed-
preference Paretianism’, i.e., the assessment of socio-economic institutions or outcomes
in terms of whether they are Pareto e cient relative to people’s revealed preferences.
For present purposes, however, we set the case of normative economics aside.
In essence, Gul and Pesendorfer hold that (positive) economics should be the sci-
ence of choice behaviour, and that its evidence base, ontology of the world, and formal
structure should focus solely on people’s observed or observable choices. Although they
do not situate their views in the context of earlier behaviouristic schools of thought in
psychology and related disciplines, Gul and Pesendorfer’s approach to economics mirrors
Pavlov’s and Skinner’s approaches to psychology and the Vienna Circle’s approach to
the philosophy of science and language. In fact, each of their central claims corresponds
to a di↵erent historical variant of behaviourism (using the taxonomy in Graham 2010).
The first claim – about the evidence base of economics – broadly corresponds to
‘psychological behaviourism’, the view that human (and animal) behaviour should be
explained solely on the basis of behavioural evidence, such as evidence about ‘exter-
nal physical stimuli, responses, learning histories, and (for certain types of behavior)
reinforcements’ (Graham 2010). If anything, the evidence accepted by those earlier psy-
chological behaviourists is less restricted than that accepted by Gul and Pesendorfer.
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The second claim – about the semantic content or meaning of any theory in economics
– corresponds to ‘analytical or logical behaviourism’, the view associated with the Vienna
Circle, Gilbert Ryle (1900-1976), and some of Ludwig Wittgenstein’s (1889-1951) work
that ‘the very idea of a mental state or condition is the idea of a behavioral disposition
or family of behavioral tendencies’ (Graham 2010). Accordingly, ‘[w]hen we attribute a
belief ... to someone, we are not saying that he or she is in a particular internal state or
condition. Instead, we are characterizing the person in terms of what he or she might
do in particular situations or environmental interactions’ (Graham 2010).
The third claim – about the methodology of theory construction in economics – is
analogous to ‘methodological behaviourism’ in psychology in that it prescribes a focus on
the representation of behaviour rather than the modelling of mental states and mental
processes in theory construction. Historically, methodological behaviourism, as defended
for instance by John Watson (1878-1958), is the view that ‘psychology should concern
itself with the behavior of organisms’ and not ‘with mental states or events or with
constructing internal information processing accounts of behavior’ (Graham 2010). Ac-
cordingly, ‘reference to mental states, such as an animal’s beliefs or desires, adds nothing
to what psychology can and should understand about the sources of behavior’ (Graham
2010), and so a theory’s goal should simply be to represent behavioural patterns. Gul
and Pesendorfer strengthen that demand by requiring that this representation take the
form of attributing to the agent the maximization of some objective function.
Figure 1 summarizes the parallels between Gul and Pesendorfer’s claims and their
historical precursors in psychology and related disciplines. Given the extent to which
Gul and Pesendorfer’s claims mirror (and perhaps reinvent) earlier behaviouristic claims,
one might ask whether their views su↵er from the same problems that those earlier
behaviourisms su↵ered from and which ultimately led to their demise. In what follows,
we draw on insights gained from some of those other cases to see what lessons can be
learnt for the case of economics.
3 Four misconceptions
We begin our defence of mentalism by arguing that Gul and Pesendorfer’s three positive
claims, like their historical precursors, rest on at least four misconceptions, which we
will call the ‘misconception of a fixed evidence base’, the ‘evidence/content conflation’,
the “‘unobservable, therefore non-existent” fallacy’, and the ‘maximization dogma’.
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Figure 1: Gul and Pesendorfer’s claims and their precursors
3.1 The misconception of a fixed evidence base
In line with psychological behaviourism, Gul and Pesendorfer argue that the only evi-
dence that should be used to test economic theories is evidence about people’s choice
behaviour. But there is no systematic reason why the evidence base of economics should
be restricted in this way. Across the sciences, it is a common phenomenon that our
available evidence base occasionally grows. Various things or phenomena that people
could not observe in the past, and which earlier generations might have regarded as spec-
ulative, have eventually turned out to be observable, through the use of more advanced
instruments, more creative experimental designs, and so on.
In physics, entities and phenomena such as the Higgs boson and various elementary
particles, forces, and fields seemed at some point to be purely theoretical constructs,
but are being increasingly turned into observable entities and phenomena – albeit indi-
rectly observable ones – through the advances in sophistication in our instruments and
experimental techniques. The advances in microscopy over the centuries are a perfect
illustration of this point. (On the lack of a static distinction between what is observable
and what is not, see, e.g., Maxwell 1962 and Shapere 1982.)
In short, the idea that the evidence base of a particular scientific discipline should be
fixed once and for all lacks any justification, given the history of science and the experi-
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ence of other scientific disciplines. Rather, the evidence base of any science is changeable
and dynamic, and there is no reason why economics should be an exception. Accordingly,
even if there was a period in the history of economics when people’s choice behaviour
was the only evidence used to test theories, there is no principled reason why other kinds
of evidence – from people’s verbal reports and communicative behaviour to physiological
and neuroscientific evidence – could not also be relevant. Indeed, psychology has long
moved on from its fixation on a behaviouristic evidence base.5
3.2 The evidence/content conflation
In line with analytical or logical behaviourism, Gul and Pesendorfer argue that the
content of any economic theory consists solely in its choice-behavioural implications; two
theories that are choice-behaviourally equivalent should be seen as equivalent simpliciter.
But even if the evidence base of economic theories were restricted to observable choice
behaviour alone – and, as we have seen, there is no principled reason why it should be –
it would not follow that the content of any economic theory should consist solely in its
choice-behavioural implications. Rather, the content of a theory can, and often does, go
well beyond its evidence base. To see that this is not just an esoteric possibility, but the
norm across many scientific disciplines, consider a few simple examples:
Archaeology and ancient history: The evidence base for theories in these sub-
jects consists of various archaeological objects and artefacts found, for instance, in exca-
vations. But the content of those theories goes well beyond these objects and artefacts.
The content, ultimately, is the life, social organization, and culture of the ancient soci-
eties in question. The reason why we are interested in old pots, pans, and other broken
items is not just that these objects are interesting in their own right, but that they tell
us something we cannot directly observe: namely how people lived in the societies under
investigation.
Paleobiology: A natural- rather than social-scientific discipline that illustrates our
point is paleobiology. Here the evidence base consists of geological findings and fossils,
but the aim of the discipline is to answer biological questions about the evolution of life
and its underlying molecular-biological mechanisms. Again, the content of the relevant
theories goes well beyond the evidence base.
The point of much of science is precisely to make creative use of what is observable
5Harsanyi (1955: 317) already observed the following: ‘In general, we have two indicators of the utility
that other people attach to di↵erent situations: their preferences as revealed by their actual choices, and
their (verbal or nonverbal) expressions of satisfaction or dissatisfaction in each situation.’
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in order to get a better understanding of certain phenomena that are not by themselves
observable. Making sense of, and organizing, empirical regularities is just one aim –
but not the only aim – of science. By organizing empirical regularities, we often find
evidential support for the existence of certain hitherto unobserved aspects of reality.
The disciplines of psychology and linguistics, unlike economics, have fully embraced
this point. Linguists in the tradition of Chomsky, for instance, argue that the observable
regularities in people’s language usage, grammaticality judgments, and initial language
acquisition give us evidence for certain underlying cognitive structures that are innate
features of human beings, but which are, of course, not themselves observable.
3.3 The ‘unobservable, therefore non-existent’ fallacy
The next misconception is also relevant to Gul and Pesendorfer’s logical or analytic claim
that the content of any theory in economics consists solely of its choice-behavioural
implications, and that two choice-behaviourally equivalent theories should be seen as
equivalent simpliciter. One route by which one might arrive at this claim is the follow-
ing. Suppose one accepts, as Gul and Pesendorfer do, that observations about people’s
choice behaviour are the only evidence that we are entitled to use to test our economic
theories. And suppose, further, one somehow accepts the principle that anything that is
not observable does not exist. It then follows that we are not entitled to treat as ‘real’
or ‘existent’ any properties or entities in economics that go beyond what we can directly
observe. And this, by stipulation, is people’s choice behaviour alone.
But even if we were to suspend our criticism of the assumption that only choice
behaviour is observable in economics, it should be obvious, as a matter of logic, that,
from the fact that a particular entity or phenomenon is not observable, it does not follow
that this entity or phenomenon does not exist. And the conclusion that the entity or
phenomenon does not exist follows even less from the fact that something is not currently
observable. Sometimes we can have strong indirect evidence for something, even though
it is not directly observable.
Electrons and other elementary particles are not, strictly speaking, directly observ-
able; we can only see their traces, for example, when they travel through a cloud chamber
(as water vapour condenses upon the impact of ionizing particles). But few people would
seriously doubt their existence.
‘Occam’s razor’ principle tells us not to postulate the existence of any unnecessary
entities. So, before we can hypothesize that something exists despite being unobserv-
able, we need to come up with at least some indirect evidence for its existence. But if
the best confirmed and most parsimonious theory of a particular phenomenon commits
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us to postulating an entity, then it is fully consistent with Occam’s razor principle to
accept its existence. The key idea behind the principle is that we should not postu-
late too many entities, but neither should we postulate too few. Consistently with this
principle, psychologists and linguists are perfectly prepared to postulate certain mental
constructs, and to treat them as real, in order to explain the observable phenomena they
are interested in.6
3.4 The maximization dogma
Implicitly relying on a particularly strong version of methodological behaviourism, Gul
and Pesendorfer suggest that any economic theory should take the form of a represen-
tation of choice behaviour, and that this representation should ideally take the form of
attributing to economic agents the maximization of some objective function. However,
while it may be a useful starting point for the explanation of behaviour to search for
some objective function that a given agent maximizes, there is no principled reason why
our best theories of economic behaviour should necessarily be based on the notion of
maximization.
Which form of a theory best explains human behaviour is a contingent, empirical
question, which can be settled only by actual scientific research, not by methodological
stipulation. Just as it has turned out to be wrong – given Einstein’s general theory
of relativity – that space and time must necessarily be Euclidean (as Immanuel Kant,
for example, assumed), so there is no a priori reason to think that the explanation of
social and economic behaviour must necessarily be based on the maximization of a single
objective function. For example, an empirically adequate theory might model agents as
being governed by a more complex system of constraints.
6We here accept that mental states are not directly observable and are similar in status to the
unobservable entities and properties in other sciences. Hausman (1998) denies that the mental states
posited in economics (e.g., the utility and subjective probability functions) are unobservables on a par
with electrons or neutrinos, and argues instead that they should be seen as part of ‘commonsense reality’,
like tables and chairs. This is because the functional role played by utilities and probabilities in economics
is ‘virtually identical’ to that played by desires and beliefs in folk psychology, and the latter are already
among our everyday ontological commitments. We accept the analogy between the mental states in
economics and those in folk psychology and agree with Hausman that those mental states should be
considered real. Yet, we think a further argument is needed to convince the skeptic that mental states in
both folk psychology and economics can be seen as real, despite their prima-facie unobservability (or at
most indirect observability). Our argument in this paper is intended to fill this gap. Several contributions
to the ‘realism-antirealism’ debate in economics (as reviewed, e.g., in Hausman 1998) either deny or do
not develop the analogy between the mental states posited in economics and the unobservables posited
in the natural sciences, and hence that debate is somewhat orthogonal to our concerns here.
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Of course, current attempts to explain economic behaviour in a non-maximization-
based way remain controversial. Examples are theories of satisficing as introduced by
Herbert Simon (1956) and theories of fast and frugal heuristics as proposed by Gerd
Gigerenzer and others (e.g., 2000). But the mere fact that these are well-defined and
eligible contenders for economic theories illustrates that the maximization of a single
objective function is not the only form an economic explanation can take. The reason
economists are divided over Simon’s and Gigerenzer’s theories is not that these theories
have the wrong form per se, but rather that it is unclear whether they o↵er the best
explanations of the empirical phenomena they are intended to explain.
4 A primer in the philosophy of science
We have identified four misconceptions underlying Gul and Pesendorfer’s (and no doubt
others’) arguments for behaviourism in economics. To clarify the distinction between
behaviourism and mentalism further, we need to introduce some key concepts from the
philosophy of science: (i) theory, (ii) model, (iii) empirical adequacy, (iv) ontological
commitment, and (v) underdetermination of theory by evidence.
4.1 What is a theory?
We begin with the orthodox, ‘syntactic’ definition of a theory and subsequently amend it
for our purposes. This definition underlies the so-called ‘deductive-nomological account’
of scientific explanation, which was famously defended by Karl Popper and Carl Gustav
Hempel, among others (for a survey, see Woodward 2009). According to this account,
to explain a body of observations is to formulate a hypothesis or set of hypotheses from
which the observations can be logically derived. In Quine’s formulation (1975), a theory
is a set of sentences, which is ideally:
(i) closed under implication, and
(ii) expressible as the set of implications of a finite (ideally small) set of basic principles
or axioms (called the theory formulation), perhaps together with some auxiliary
assumptions.
Clause (i) is a technical stipulation which signals that a theory is taken to be logically
committed to all its implications. We can thus formally identify a theory with its body
of implications. There is no presumption that all those implications are known. In
practice, the users of a theory will know only some of its implications and will represent
the theory in terms of its theory formulation, as specified in clause (ii).
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Newtonian physics is a paradigm example of a theory that fits this definition. Here,
the theory formulation consists of Newton’s three laws of motion and his law of universal
gravitation, and the theory itself consists of all the implications of those basic principles.
To arrive at a Newtonian theory of a specific physical system, such as the solar system, we
must add to the original theory formulation some system-specific auxiliary assumptions
and initial conditions. These must specify the relevant physical bodies and their initial
configuration: their masses and positions, and the forces acting on them. The theory’s
predictions about the system’s behaviour will then be among the resulting implications.
(Formally, this means that we are taking the union of the original theory formulation
and the set of auxiliary assumptions and initial conditions and are then defining the
amended theory as the set of all sentences that are implied by that union.)
Of course, scientists normally do not think of a theory simply as an uninterpreted
set of sentences, but have some interpretation in mind. An interpreted theory is a set of
sentences that is endowed with an intended interpretation – or with a set of admissible
interpretations. We now make this more precise. This will allow us to accommodate
some insights from so-called ‘semantic’ conceptions of a theory, which define a theory,
not as a set of sentences with a certain structure, but as a set of models with a certain
structure (e.g., van Fraassen 1980).7
4.2 What is a model of a theory?
To define the notion of a model, we first introduce a basic notion from formal logic: that
of a semantic interpretation of the language in which the theory is expressed. This is
• an assignment of truth-values to all sentences in that language,
which, in turn, is based on
• a definition of a domain of objects (or possibly a family of domains of objects of
di↵erent types, depending on how many types of objects the theory refers to),
• an interpretation of all predicates, relations, and functions that the theory uses,
as predicates, relations, and functions over the relevant objects, and
• an assignment of objects to all constant symbols used by the theory.
We call a semantic interpretation that renders a given theory formally true – i.e., which
assigns the truth-value ‘true’ to all sentences of the theory – a model of that theory. Any
7It goes without saying that many subtly di↵erent variants of both syntactic and semantic definitions
can be given; the details are not the focus of this paper.
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consistent theory has at least one model, and typically many. Each model corresponds to
one possible (hypothetical) way the world could be – one possible world – consistent with
the theory. The model’s domain of objects (or family of domains) then represents the
objects that exist in that hypothetical world, and the predicates, relations, and functions
correspond to the properties of, and relations between, those objects.
Now, some models of a theory, while being formally well-defined, do not match the
intended interpretation of the theory, perhaps because the objects they specify, and the
various relations in which they stand, have nothing to do with the real-world objects
and real-world relations that the theory is intended to capture. Among the multiplicity
of possible models, we may therefore pick out some that we deem admissible, and set
aside others that we deem inadmissible. The latter might be too non-standard or too
far-fetched, or simply too distinct from the intended interpretation.
We thus define an interpreted theory as a theory that is endowed with a set of admis-
sible models. Formally, an interpreted theory can be viewed as a pair consisting of a set
T of sentences, as defined earlier, and a set M of interpretations, where each interpre-
tation in M qualifies as a model of T . The first component of this pair corresponds to a
theory in the syntactic sense, the second component to a theory in the semantic sense.
The notion of an interpreted theory thus combines syntactic and semantic elements.
This notion leaves room for ‘thinner’ and ‘thicker’ ways of interpreting a theory.
Someone who opts for a very ‘thin’ interpretation of a given syntactic theory T will
deem all or most formally well-defined models of T admissible, thereby specifying a
very large set M . By contrast, someone who opts for a very ‘thick’ interpretation of T
may have in mind a single, concrete model which he or she deems uniquely admissible,
thereby renderingM maximally small. Typically, the intended interpretation of a theory
falls somewhere between these extremes: i.e., several but not all models of T are deemed
admissible.
4.3 What does it mean for a theory to be empirically adequate?
Informally, empirical adequacy can be defined as follows:
‘a theory is empirically adequate exactly if what it says about the observable
things and events in this world, is true – exactly if it saves the phenomena.’
(van Fraassen 1980: 12; also quoted in Monton and Mohler 2012)
This can be spelt out either in syntactic terms or in semantic ones. From a syntactic
perspective, a theory T is empirically adequate with respect to some body of observation
sentences S – i.e., ideally the set of all sentences expressing our empirical observations –
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if and only if these sentences are among the theory’s implications, formally if and only if
T logically entails S. This is the notion of empirical adequacy underlying the deductive-
nomological account of scientific explanation. To apply this definition in practice, we
must usually include some relevant auxiliary assumptions and/or initial conditions in T .
In the example of a Newtonian theory of the solar system, as already noted, we must
take T to be the body of implications of Newton’s laws, together with our specification
of the constituent celestial bodies and their initial conditions. The theory is then (at
least approximately) adequate with respect to a set S of observation sentences about
the motion of the planets around the sun. It is not adequate, on the other hand, with
respect to a body of sentences about the behaviour of objects whose velocity is close to
the speed of light, as Einstein famously pointed out.
From a semantic perspective, a theory, now endowed with a set M of admissible
models, is empirically adequate if it ‘has at least one model [in M ] that all the actual
phenomena fit inside’ (van Fraassen 1980: 12). To make this precise, we must designate
certain parts of any given model as ‘empirical substructures’, i.e., ‘candidates for the
direct representation of observable phenomena’ (van Fraassen 1980: 64). Empirical ade-
quacy then requires that all observed phenomena – definable as the ‘structures which can
be described in experimental and measurement reports’ – are ‘isomorphic to empirical
substructures of that model’ (van Fraassen 1980: 64).8
Empirical adequacy (or at least approximate empirical adequacy, a notion that could
be analyzed further) is typically a minimal desideratum on a good scientific theory.
Importantly, it is not the same as truth of the theory. Truth is a more demanding, and
more elusive, notion. According to the correspondence theory, informally speaking, a
theory is true if everything it says matches reality, not only with respect to observable
features, but also with respect to the underlying unobservable features. Slightly more
formally, this requires that one of the theory’s models in full (not just certain empirical
substructures of it) stands in a structure-preserving correspondence (a homomorphism)
with the relevant structures in the world. In practice, of course, approximate truth is
the most we can hope to achieve in science (for a review, see Chakravartty 2014).
8This is less demanding than requiring that the actual phenomena fit inside every model of the theory.
In e↵ect, van Fraassen’s definition of empirical adequacy requires that the observable phenomena be
compatible with the theory. The traditional, syntactic definition of empirical adequacy requires that
the observable phenomena be implied by the theory, in line with the deductive-nomological approach.
In principle, each notion of empirical adequacy (the one based on implication and the one based on
compatibility) could be defined either syntactically or semantically. Here we set this issue aside.
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4.4 What are the ontological commitments of a theory?
We have defined a theory as a set of sentences, endowed with a set of admissible models.
By considering all these models, we can ask which kinds of objects, properties, and
relations are present in all of them. These can be seen as the objects, properties,
and relations that the theory is – in a logical sense – minimally committed to. We
call them the theory’s ontological commitments.9 The theory, according to its own
admissible models, could not be true without them. It is important to note that the
admissible models need not all be isomorphic to one another. Some models may be
‘sparser’ than others, e.g., have a smaller domain of objects. Hence something will count
as an ontological commitment of a given theory only if it is a common presence in all
admissible models. (We set aside a number of subtleties here, which have been discussed
in detail by logicians and model theorists. See, e.g., Bricker 2014.)
This notion of an ontological commitment is very natural. Consider, for example, the
theory of arithmetic as defined by the Peano axioms, the fundamental axioms of arith-
metic. Let any standard model of these axioms count as admissible; i.e., we adopt the
ordinary interpretation of arithmetic. Any standard model has a domain of objects with
the formal properties of the natural numbers. Therefore – and as we would intuitively
expect – a set of objects playing the role of the natural numbers is among the ontologi-
cal commitments of Peano arithmetic. In fact, we reach a similar conclusion even if we
do not restrict our attention to standard models of arithmetic, but deem non-standard
models admissible as well: such models include ‘non-standard’ numbers, in addition to
the ‘standard’ ones. What all models of Peano arithmetic have in common is that they
include a set of objects with the structure of the natural numers (even though some
models – namely non-standard ones – include additional objects).
For another example, consider the standard theory of particle physics, which o↵ers
a unified theory of electromagnetic, weak, and strong nuclear interactions, while still
leaving out gravity. Just as the natural numbers are a common presence in any model
of Peano arithmetic (standard or non-standard), so certain kinds of elementary particles
can be found in any non-trivial model of the standard theory of particle physics, such
as quarks, leptons (of which electrons are special cases), and di↵erent kinds of bosons.
Most of these have also been experimentally identified, using instruments such as the
Large Hadron Collider at CERN, Switzerland, but at least until recently the Higgs boson
remained empirically undiscovered. The theory has always been logically committed to
9This definition draws on Quine’s account of ontological commitment, although it formally amends it
by explicitly quantifying over admissible models. Quine’s account is summarized by his famous slogan:
‘[t]o be is to be the value of a variable’ (1948).
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its existence, however, since the theory could not be true without it.
The present notion of ontological commitment is central to the so-called naturalistic
attitude towards ontological questions (Quine 1948; Fine 1984; Musgrave 1989). To fig-
ure out what entities, properties, and relations there are in any given area, according to
this attitude, we should not engage in armchair metaphysical reasoning, but consult our
best scientific theories of that area. Unless we have independent reasons to doubt those
theories, we should take their ontological commitments at face value. This means that
we should (at least provisionally) accept that the entities, properties, and relations to
which the theories are committed correspond to real entities, properties, and relations.
This attitude is common in normal scientific practice, outside the philosophy classroom.
For example, if our best physical theories tell us that there are quarks, leptons, and
bosons, we have every reason to believe in these particles’ existence, regardless of their
unobservable status. This naturalistic attitude goes against a form of anti-realism ac-
cording to which we may pick and choose among a theory’s ontological commitments
and take only some at face value (say, those which correspond to observables), while
treating others as merely convenient constructs, fictions, or metaphors (say, those which
correspond to unobservables). (For a comprehensive discussion and defence of scientific
realism, see Psillos 1999.)
4.5 Underdetermination of theory by evidence
In principle but often also in practice, there can be two or more distinct theories that co-
incide in their observable implications, but which are logically incompatible with respect
to some unobservable implications. In such a case, we speak of the underdetermination
of theory by evidence. This problem was famously discussed by Quine (e.g., 1975; see
also List 1999). Why does this problem arise?
In syntactic terms, a theory T logically entails its observable implications, but usually
not the other way round. If the theory is empirically adequate, our body of observation
sentences – call it S – will be a subset of T , but T will typically go beyond S. In
particular, T may also have some unobservable implications. In semantic terms, the
observed phenomena usually correspond not to an entire model, but only to certain
‘empirical substructures’ of such a model. Hence the observed phenomena are logically
insu cient to fix an admissible set M of models. Distinct theories, with distinct sets of
admissible models, may accommodate the same phenomena.
A simple illustration of this problem in economics is given by the assignment of a von-
Neumann-Morgenstern utility function to an agent. For the purposes of the example, let
us treat this utility function as our ‘theory’ of this agent’s choice behaviour. As is well
16
known, there is not just one utility function that fits an agent’s choice behaviour, but an
infinite number. The function is unique only up to positive a ne transformations.10 Of
course, in the present example, nothing much hinges on the properties of the function
that are left underdetermined, such as whether the agent’s utility in one situation is
twice as large as that in another. Indeed, most economists would not consider such
statements meaningful; they would regard the question of which specific von-Neumann-
Morgenstern utility function (as opposed to which equivalence class) is the right one as
indeterminate. The underdetermination problem would come to trouble us only if we
wanted to use von-Neumann-Morgenstern utilities as a measure of satisfaction or well-
being whose levels or units are meaningful (thereby enabling interpersonal comparisons),
something many economists would reject. (For a discussion, see List 2003.)
Generally, however, the problem of underdetermination of theory by evidence raises
important questions for the status of the unobservable implications of any theory and its
ontological commitments. When a theory is underdetermined by the evidence (so that
there could be an empirically equivalent theory with di↵erent unobservable implications
and di↵erent ontological commitments), we face the question of whether there is a fact
of the matter about the theory’s unobservables and what would settle this fact. In
particular, we will have to ask whether there is a way of creatively extending the evidence
base so as to devise an empirical test to break the underdetermination. If we insisted
that there is no fact of the matter, we would have to conclude that we are faced with a
case of indeterminacy.
The main insight to be gained from this philosophy-of-science primer, for present
purposes, is that the question of what our evidence for a particular theory is – or even
what the maximal body of evidence could be – is fundamentally distinct from, and not
to be confused with, the question of what the theory’s ontological commitments are.
5 Two kinds of ‘revealed preference’ approaches
We are now in a position to distinguish more clearly between two kinds of ‘revealed
preference’ approaches to economic theory, and to see whether they commit us to be-
haviourism (for classic works on revealed preferences, see Samuelson 1938; Richter 1966;
and Sen 1971). One kind of approach is defined in terms of an epistemological thesis,
the other in terms of an ontological one. As we will see, only one of the two theses
– arguably the less plausible one – is genuinely behaviouristic, while the other is fully
10Indeed, setting certain structural constraints aside, any positive monotonic transform of such a
function may arguably serve as a utility representation (see Weymark 1991).
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compatible with mentalism.11
An epistemological ‘revealed preference’ thesis: Our body of evidence for any
theory in economics is restricted to agents’ choice behaviour.
An ontological ‘revealed preference’ thesis: The ontological commitments of
any theory in economics – or at least those ontological commitments that we are entitled
to take at face value – are restricted to agents’ choices and choice-behavioural patterns
and therefore exclude mental states.
First consider the epistemological thesis. Although we have already disputed that the
evidence base should be fixed as stated by that thesis, some economists might still accept
it for stipulative reasons: they might stipulate that what demarcates economics from
neighbouring disciplines such as psychology is its reliance on choice-behavioural evidence,
rather than richer psychological evidence. This justification for the epistemological thesis
may seem ad hoc, but it is not incoherent.
The ontological thesis, by contrast, is harder to defend. At least in the technical sense
introduced above, the ontological commitments of standard (micro-)economic theories
include some ‘mental-state constructs’ such as preference relations, utility functions,
or subjective probability functions. Their role is to rationalize, systematize, or explain
observed choice behaviour, but they are formally distinct from that behaviour. Relations
or functions that formally play the role of preferences, utilities, or subjective probabilities
– for short, which play the preference-or-belief role – can be found in virtually every
theory in (micro-)economics. Any model of such a theory must then have the relevant
relations or functions among its structural elements. Recall that, technically, a theory is
committed to everything that is present in all its admissible models, which here includes
the relations or functions in question. Of course, this does not yet imply that these
correspond to anything real in the world.
To uphold the ontological ‘revealed-preference’ thesis, one would have to insist that,
even when a theory is technically committed to such ‘mental-state constructs’ (by which
we simply mean: relations or functions playing a preference-or-belief role), we should
not take these at face value. Instead, we should interpret them as instrumentally useful
modelling devices, which serve to represent the agent’s choice behaviour, but do not
correspond to anything real. In short, we would have to be anti-realists with respect
to all those elements of our economic models that go beyond choice behaviour – the
‘unobservables’ of our theory. As we will argue in the next section, however, this would
11The taxonomy of di↵erent kinds of psychological behaviourism in Moore (2001) also suggests that
some more modest, methodological (non-radical) forms of behaviourism are compatible with mentalism.
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Figure 2: Possible views about ‘revealed preferences’
conflict with the naturalistic ontological attitude we have introduced.
Another point is worth noting. Even if we accept the epistemological ‘revealed pref-
erence’ thesis, this does not compel us to accept its ontological counterpart. Economic
theories can be committed to certain mental-state constructs, even if we use only choice-
behavioural evidence to establish their adequacy. This shows that the epistemological
‘revealed preference’ thesis does not imply the ontological one, and thus that the episte-
mological thesis is compatible with an ontological commitment to mental states. Indeed,
the etymology of the term ‘revealed preferences’ suggests just this: an agent’s behaviour
‘reveals’ – is evidence for – something other than behaviour, namely the agent’s mental
states – his or her preferences – which cause the behaviour in question.
In sum, behaviourists and mentalists are divided on two questions: first, whether or
not the evidence base of economics should be restricted to choice behaviour, and second,
whether the relations or functions playing a preference-or-belief role in economic theories
should be treated as mere theoretical constructs or as corresponding to real phenomena.
Figure 2 shows the di↵erent possible views.12
12The distinction between radical behaviourism and mentalism with a narrow evidence base is similar
to Cozic’s (2012) distinction between a stronger and a weaker sense in which conventional models of
choice can be ‘cognitively mute’.
19
6 An argument for mentalism
Our objections to behaviourism, especially of the radical, ontological sort, should already
be clear from our discussion up to this point. We now wish to state our argument for
mentalism more positively. Recall that a radical behaviourist holds the view that even
if a theory is formally committed to certain relations or functions playing a preference-
or-belief role, these are nothing more than theoretical constructs: they may be instru-
mentally useful for making sense of behavioural regularities, but they should not be seen
as corresponding to anything real. As our philosophy-of-science primer should indicate,
however, this view goes against the naturalistic attitude towards ontological questions.13
According to that attitude, once something – say, an entity or property – is among
the ontological commitments of a well-established scientific theory, we ought to take it at
face value, unless we have independent reasons to doubt the theory itself. Our acceptance
of the theory, naturalistically speaking, commits us to accepting the existence of that
entity or property. To ask whether the entity or property ‘really’ exists, after it has been
established as one of the theory’s ontological commitments, is to ask one question too
many; or alternatively, it is to express doubts about the theory itself. Therefore, when
our best theories of economic decision-making are committed to certain mental-state
constructs in the technical sense (i.e., relations or functions playing a preference-or-
belief role), we should treat these as corresponding to real features of the world, unless
we wish to reject those theories themselves.
Could one still object that although the relevant relations or functions correspond
to something real in the world, they need not correspond to mental states of the agents
in question? They could simply correspond to certain functions or structures which
somehow exist in the world and are systematically related to the agents’ choices, but
which need not count as mental states. But this misses the point of what mental states
are.
Mental states are, at least in part, states that play a certain role for an agent. Beliefs,
for example, play the role of representing certain features of the world from the agent’s
perspective, and preferences play the role of motivating the agent’s actions (see, e.g.,
List and Pettit 2011: ch. 1). Functionalism is the view that what makes something a
mental state is simply that it plays the relevant role. On a less demanding view, playing
13Although we follow a Quine-inspired approach to ontology, our mentalistic conclusion departs from
Quine’s own philosophy, since Quine was critical of mental constructs in science. Arguably, Quine’s own
behaviouristic approach has been superseded, and a broadly Quinean naturalism lends itself well to a
defence of a naturalistic form of realism about mental states. On Quine’s philosophy, see Hylton (2007).
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this role is one of the features of a mental state, though perhaps not the only one.14
So, playing a preference-or-belief role need not be constitutive of a mental state; it can
merely be indicative. This less demanding view is su cient for our purposes. As noted
in the last section, our best economic theories of individual decision making are certainly
committed to certain relations or functions that formally play preference-or-belief roles.
From the standpoint of a naturalistic ontological attitude, these can then be taken to
correspond to real relations or functions playing such roles. And since playing those roles
is indicative of mental states, we should, at least provisionally, treat the ‘mental-state
relations or functions’ posited by our theories as corresponding to real mental states of
the agents in question.15
It is important to note that taking a theory’s mental-state constructs to correspond
to real mental states is fully consistent with acknowledging that they depict these mental
states in a simplified or idealized way (and perhaps only capture ‘structural’ rather than
‘intrinsic’ features of those mental states). This is no di↵erent than acknowledging that
a physical theory’s depiction of a planet or a volcano greatly simplifies or idealizes the
details of the real planet or volcano it refers to. Recall that the relationship between
the world and its representation by a scientific theory is at best a homomorphic one,
which preserves certain structural features but which still abstracts away from many
substantive details.
We can now summarize our argument:16
Premise 1: Some mental-state constructs – by which we mean: relations or func-
tions playing the role of preferences or beliefs – are technically among the ontological
commitments of our best theories of economic decision making.
14One question we cannot address here concerns the relationship between the functional role of mental
states (e.g., the representational or motivational roles of beliefs and preferences) and their phenomenal
or conscious character (roughly, what it subjectively feels like to have such mental states). Some
philosophers, especially dualists, hold that certain mental states have phenomenal (conscious) aspects
above and beyond their functional aspects. Others consider these phenomenal aspects a by-product of
their functional aspects. Yet others deny the existence of phenomenal aspects altogether. For an overview
of the debate, see Chalmers (2010). Here, we focus only on the functional aspects of mental states, which
are most relevant to economics as a positive science. For a discussion of functionalism, see Block (1980).
15A particularly strong form of mentalism – a radical limiting case – might be derived from a ‘direct
realist’ attitude towards our theory of an agent’s decision making. According to such an attitude, which
goes beyond what we are arguing for in this paper, a given scientific theory has only one intended model:
namely the world itself or the fragment of the world in which we are interested. When we speak about
mental states in our theory, we would then be referring directly to the agent’s mental states in the world.
16Some of the philosophical ideas underlying this naturalistic argument are developed in List (2014),
specifically in the defence of intentional agency as a real (albeit higher-level) phenomenon.
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Premise 2: In any normal science, the criterion for whether a theoretically pos-
tulated entity, property, or relation should be treated, at least provisionally, as corre-
sponding to a real entity, property, or relation is whether it is among the ontological
commitments of our best theory or theories in the relevant area – assuming we have no
independent reasons to doubt those theories themselves.
Premise 3: Economics is a normal science.
Conclusion: The mental-state constructs to which our best economic theories are
committed should be treated, at least provisionally, as corresponding to real phenomena
– assuming we have no independent reasons to doubt those theories themselves.
The argument is clearly valid (i.e., the premises logically entail the conclusion).
Whether the argument is also sound depends on whether the premises are all true.
Given the nature of practically all our current (micro-)economic theories, ranging from
classical rational choice theory to more recent psychologically oriented theories (e.g.,
Camerer et al. 2004), Premise 1 is true in light of our technical definition of an ontological
commitment, as already discussed. Premise 2 is also true, since it states a basic principle
underlying standard scientific practice: the naturalistic ontological attitude. Premise 3
is a claim that critics of economics might wish to challenge, but scientifically minded
economists are unlikely to object to it.
Consequently, the only way to avoid the mentalistic conclusion would be to insist on
having doubts about our economic theories themselves, despite their status as our best
scientific theories in the relevant area. But those asserting such doubts would then have
to explain what evidence underpins them. We suspect that few economists would wish to
make their argument against mentalism dependent on a rejection of the adequacy of our
best economic theories themselves. We conclude that just as we have strong prima-facie
reasons to accept the reality of quarks, leptons, and bosons in particle physics, so we
have strong prima-facie reasons to accept the reality of mental states in economics.
It is worth clarifying how this conclusion di↵ers from the view held by radical be-
haviourists. We are not suggesting that radical behaviourists such as Gul and Pesendor-
fer will deny the reality of mental states when they take o↵ their ‘hats’ as professional
economists and adopt a commonsense view of the world, for instance while interacting
with other people in their day-to-day lives. What they are committed to denying is that
mental states should be part of the scientific ontology of economics.
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7 Does the di↵erence between mentalism and behaviourism
matter?
One might think that the di↵erence between mentalism and behaviourism is a purely
metaphysical matter, which is irrelevant to the practice of economics itself. But this
impression is misleading. That the di↵erence matters also in practice can be seen by
revisiting the empirical underdetermination problem, the problem that there can exist
two or more distinct theories that are empirically equivalent but logically incompatible.
First consider the idealized limiting case of no underdetermination. Take a simple
choice problem without risk or uncertainty, where an agent has perfectly well-behaved
choice dispositions over some options, satisfying all the standard rationality conditions.
The agent’s choice behaviour – formally represented by a choice function – can then be
uniquely rationalized by a preference ordering over the given options (e.g., Sen 1971;
Bossert and Suzumura 2010) (note that the conditions for achieving such a unique ratio-
nalization are demanding). Although this rationalization involves, technically speaking,
a mental-state construct – namely a binary relation that formally plays a preference
role – preference orderings and choice functions stand in a one-to-one correspondence in
this case. As long as rationalization of choices is required to take the form of ascribing
to the agent a weak ordering, there is no underdetermination of preferences by choice
behaviour here: there exists one and only one preference ordering that entails the given
choice behaviour.17 Consequently, there are no logical implications of the mental state
ascription that go beyond what is already encoded in the choice function itself, and no
issues of indeterminacy arise: there are behaviourally observable facts about everything
the theory says. Hence, one might regard the question of what the ontological status
of the ascribed preferences is, over and above the agent’s choice behaviour, as primarily
metaphysical.
Now, however, consider a less idealized case. A much-discussed example is due to
Amartya Sen (1993).
The polite dinner-party guest: Given a choice between a large, a medium-sized,
and a small apple, a dinner-party guest (who at home would choose larger over smaller
apples) chooses the medium-sized apple – in Sen’s story, for politeness. If the large apple
is no longer available while the medium-sized and small ones still are, the guest chooses
the small apple – again for politeness.
17If we lift the requirement that rationalization take the form of the ascription of a weak ordering to
the agent, and allow other forms of rationalization (e.g., in terms of other mathematical structures), then
the underdetermination problem can arise even in the present case of choice without risk or uncertainty.
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The agent’s choice function violates contraction consistency and cannot be rational-
ized by a preference ordering over apples. But it would be a bad explanation to suggest
that the agent is irrational; this explanation would violate the principle of charity in in-
terpretation (see, e.g., Davidson 1973). Rather, the agent is motivated by considerations
over and above the sizes of the apples. However, if choice behaviour is the only evidence
we can go by – for instance, we cannot ask the agent what the reasons for his or her
choices were – then we face an underdetermination problem. Several distinct hypothe-
ses will entail the same choice behaviour, ranging from the hypothesis that the agent
has complicated (perhaps ‘non-consequentialist’) preferences over ‘extended alternatives’
(object-context pairs) to the hypothesis that he or she is governed by various norms of
politeness, approval- or esteem-seeking, or other social constraints (e.g., Bhattacharyya
et al. 2011; Bossert and Suzumura 2009; Suzumura and Xu 2001; Brennan and Pettit
2005). The agent’s choice behaviour alone is insu cient to distinguish between these
and other rival explanations.
Does this mean that there is no fact of the matter as to what the correct explana-
tion is? Both our psychological understanding and the practices of other cognitive and
behavioural sciences suggest that there can be a real di↵erence between di↵erent rival
explanations, despite their choice-behavioural equivalence. First of all, they attribute
di↵erent internal cognitive mechanisms to the agent and di↵erent first-person experi-
ences, which would lead us to predict di↵erent introspective reports from him or her, if
we could elicit a truthful response. Second, di↵erent explanations may also have di↵erent
repercussions further down the line. Only some but not all explanations may cohere with
our explanations of other related phenomena or allow us to predict the agent’s choices
in other, hitherto unobserved situations. Thus a suitably broadened evidence base may
allow us to distinguish between di↵erent explanations of an agent’s choices. In short,
the availability of di↵erent choice-behaviourally equivalent explanations does not imply
that there is no fact of the matter as to what the correct explanation is.
Wakker (2010: 3; drawing on Harre´ 1970) distinguishes between paramorphic and
homeomorphic models of decision making. A paramorphic model ‘describes the empirical
phenomena of interest correctly, but the processes underlying the empirical phenomena
are not matched by processes in the model’. A homeomorphic model, by contrast, has the
property that ‘not only its empirical phenomena match reality, but also its underlying
processes do so’. In outlining a research programme for decision theory, he suggests that
we should aim to arrive at homeomorphic models and that this is what prospect theory
seeks to do: ‘Not only [should] the decisions predicted by the model match the decisions
observed, but we also want the theoretical parameters in the model to have plausible
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psychological interpretations’.18
Sharing this goal, several recent works in decision theory emphasize the importance
of ‘reasons for choice’ or ‘psychological states’ over and above the choice behaviour in-
duced by them. Some of these works explicitly employ mentalist terminology, such as
‘epistemic states’, ‘knowledge’, and ‘beliefs’ in epistemic game theory (e.g., Aumann and
Brandenburger 1995); ‘belief-dependent emotions’ in psychological games (Geanakoplos
and Pearce 1989); ‘emotions’ such as ‘anger’ or ‘fear’ (Elster 1998; Loewenstein 2000);
‘thinking’ and ‘feeling’ (Romer 2000); ‘intrinsic’ and ‘extrinsic motivations’, ‘ego boost-
ing’ and ‘ego bashing’ (Be´nabou and Tirole 2003); ‘rationales’ (Manzini and Mariotti
2007; Cherepanov et al. 2013); ‘moods’ and ‘mindsets’ (Manzini and Mariotti 2012);
‘motivating reasons’ and ‘weighing of reasons’ (Dietrich and List 2013a; 2013b; 2015);
‘experiences’ (Dietrich 2012); and ‘the minds of checklist users’ (Mandler et al. 2012).
In sum, since choice behaviour routinely underdetermines its theoretical explanation,
good scientific practice requires us to consider all the di↵erent rival explanations and then
creatively to identify an enriched evidence base, and more advanced empirical designs,
to determine which explanation is most adequate – in particular, which is most home-
omorphic and not merely paramorphic. The enriched base might include novel choice
situations, psychological data over and above choice behaviour, verbal reports, related
social phenomena, and occasionally (for plausibility checks) even introspection. How-
ever, even if we fail to find a purely empirical criterion for picking out a unique correct
theory, Occam’s razor principle would tell us to choose a theory which is ontologically
not too rich, but also not too sparse, to explain our observations parsimoniously.
8 Can economics be reduced to neuroscience?
Some neuroscientists hope to dispense with traditional psychological theories by ex-
plaining psychological phenomena in terms of neurophysiological processes in the brain
(for a critical discussion, see Bennett et al. 2007). Similarly, some of the most radi-
cal neuroeconomists hope to dispense with traditional economic theories by explaining
18Wakker (2010: 3) also stresses that the evidence base and domain of economic explanations should
not be considered fixed: ‘[Milton] Friedman’s arguments in favor of paramorphic models are legitimate
if all that is desired is to explain and predict a prespecified and limited domain of phenomena. It
is, however, usually desirable if concepts are broadly applicable, also for future and as yet unforeseen
developments in research. Homeomorphic models are best suited for this purpose. In recent years,
economics has been opening up to introspective and neuro-imaging data. It is to be expected that the
concepts of prospect theory, in view of their sound psychological basis, will be well suited for such future
developments and for connections with such domains of research.’
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economic behaviour in terms of agents’ brain processes (for discussion, see Camerer et
al. 2005). At first sight, one might think that scientific progress is inexorably headed
in this direction, and many advances in science seem to confirm this picture. Through-
out the sciences, we are gaining a better understanding of the ‘lower-level’ mechanisms
underlying ‘higher-level’ phenomena, for instance the biochemical mechanisms underly-
ing the functioning of cells, the cellular mechanisms underlying the life of organisms,
and the individual-level mechanisms underlying larger social processes. The search for
micro-foundations of macroscopic phenomena, with a view to replacing less fundamental
theories (at a higher level) with more fundamental ones (at a lower level), is en vogue.
Yet, there is a common misconception underlying many of these attempts at theory
reduction. The misconception can be termed the ‘supervenience implies explanatory
reducibility’ fallacy. To explain this fallacy, let us consider a familiar argument for
theory reduction. Its (correct) premise is that the world is fundamentally made up of
elementary particles, atoms, and molecules, which stand in various physical and chemical
relations to each other and whose interaction underlies all more complex phenomena,
including the functioning and behaviour of organisms. More formally:
The supervenience thesis: The totality of ‘lower-level’, physical facts about the
world determines all ‘higher-level’ facts, such as facts about organisms and their be-
haviour.
It is then argued that, because everything in the world ‘supervenes’ on the physical,
the best explanation of any phenomenon must also be a physical one.
The explanatory-reducibility thesis: Any phenomenon in the world can and
should ideally be explained in terms of underlying physical mechanisms. Any non-
physical explanations – such as psychological or social explanations – are at best provi-
sional and reflect a lack of understanding of underlying mechanisms.
The claim that psychology can be reduced to neuroscience is sometimes defended in
just this way. Psychological phenomena are surely the result of underlying neurophysio-
logical brain processes, and ‘so’, the reasoning goes, our most fundamental explanations
of them should also be given at the neurophysiological level.
But does supervenience really imply explanatory reducibility? A large body of work
in philosophy challenges this view, beginning with Jerry Fodor’s (1974) and Hilary Put-
nam’s (1975) classic arguments that the sheer combinatorial complexity of the relation-
ship between the physical states of a person’s brain and the psychological states of his or
her mind rules out the e↵ective reducibility of psychological ‘natural kinds’ (which are
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the relata of regularities that we are interested in) to purely neurophysiological ones.19
What makes ‘higher-level’ mental states, such as beliefs and desires, more explanato-
rily useful than ‘lower-level’ patterns of neural activity is precisely that they abstract
away from a large number of physical details that are irrelevant, even detrimental, to
the explanatory purposes at hand. Supervenience, in short, does not imply explanatory
reducibility (for a defence of this anti-reductionistic view, see List and Menzies 2009;
for a structurally similar discussion in relation to the individualism-holism debate in the
philosophy of social science, see List and Spiekermann 2013).
Consider, for example, how you would explain a cat’s appearance in the kitchen
when the owner is preparing some food. You could either try (and in reality fail) to
understand the cat’s neurophysiological processes which begin with (i) some sensory
stimuli, then (ii) trigger some complicated neural responses, and finally (iii) activate the
cat’s muscles so as to put it on a trajectory towards the kitchen. Or you could ascribe
to the cat (i) the belief that there is food available in the kitchen, and (ii) the desire
to eat, so that (iii) it is rational for the cat to go to the kitchen. It should be evident
that the second explantion is both simpler and more illuminating, o↵ering much greater
predictive power. The belief-desire explanation can easily be adjusted, for example,
if conditions change. If you give the cat some visible or smellable evidence that food
will be available in the living room rather than the kitchen, you can predict that it
will update its beliefs and go to the living room instead. By contrast, one cannot even
begin to imagine the informational overload that would be involved in adjusting the
neurophysiological explanation to accommodate this change.
Good explanations – ones that are parsimonious and predictively successful – should
identify the most functionally relevant regularities, while leaving out extraneous details.
Functionally relevant regularities, in turn, need not be found at the most fine-grained
level of description. It is an empirical question at which level of description any given
system exhibits the most tractable regularities. There is no reason, for example, why
a good theory of forest ecology should refer to quantum-mechanical e↵ects inside the
individual atoms in each tree. Similarly, if you want to explain why Microsoft Windows
crashes if you install a particular software package, you should first look at possible
programme errors or incorrect system parameters before trying to give a detailed account
of the flow of individual electrons in the computer’s micro-processor and memory chips.
19More technically, the inverse image, with respect to the relevant supervenience function from physical
brain states to psychological states, of any set of psychological states forming a ‘natural kind’ at the
psychological level need not be a set of physical brain states forming a ‘natural kind’ at the physical
level. For a critical discussion of multiple-realizability arguments against reductionism, see Sober (1999).
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As Daniel Dennett (1987) has argued, we explain the behaviour of certain organisms
in terms of their mental states and not in terms of complicated physical processes –
thereby taking an ‘intentional’ rather than ‘physical stance’ towards those organisms –
precisely because this is the level of explanation most suited for the explanatory purpose
at hand. A doctor who wishes to treat a brain hemorrhage or a tumor may well take
a physical stance towards the patient, at least during the medical intervention, but it
is far from clear how much economists can gain from trying to explain socio-economic
behaviour by looking at people’s brains, rather than interpreting their minds.
All of this is consistent, of course, with the idea of enriching the evidence base
of economics when this helps us to distinguish between di↵erent rival theories, and
this could certainly include some neuroeconomic evidence. But it should be clear that
neither the focus on behaviour alone, nor the focus on brain physiology alone, can deliver
satisfactory economic theories. (For a nuanced defence of a ‘non-revolutionary’ approach
to neuroeconomics, see Craver and Alexandrova 2008.)
9 Concluding remarks
We have o↵ered an argument for mentalism, and against behaviourism, in economics.
We have not only responded to the central epistemological and ontological claims made
by behaviourists, but also distinguished mentalism from the more radical neuroeconomic
view that economic behaviour should be explained in terms of agents’ brain processes,
as distinct from their mental states. Gul and Pesendorfer (2008) seem to miss this
distinction, frequently equating the mental with the neural and treating what might
charitably be understood as a case for a ‘brainless economics’ (i.e., for an economic
science separate from, and not reducible to, neuroscience) as a case for a ‘mindless
economics’ instead (i.e., for an economic science free from mental-state ascriptions).
Our present critique of behaviourism di↵ers from other, more familiar critiques of be-
haviourism and ‘revealed preference’ approaches (see, among others, Sen 1977; Hausman
2000; Ko˝szegi and Rabin 2007; Craver and Alexandrova 2008; and Bermudez 2009). The
behaviouristic account of preferences (and other mental states such as beliefs) is often
criticized for what it fails to deliver: (i) it fails to say anything about human psychology,
motivation, and the mechanisms of decision making, all of which it leaves out of the
picture; (ii) it fails to provide adequate foundations for normative economics, as it gives
at most an impoverished account of human well-being, says nothing about fundamental
desires and interests, and renders interpersonal comparisons of utility impossible (all
of which may matter for policy-making); (iii) it fails to ‘explain’ behaviour in a non-
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circular way, since behaviour is ‘explained’ by preferences (or other attributes) that are
in turn defined in terms of behaviour; and (iv) it ‘insulate[s] economics from possible
contributions fromother disciplines’, by rendering findings from fields such as psychology
irrelevant to economics by methodological design (Craver and Alexandrova 2008: 396).
While such arguments are important and can be (indeed have been) made, we have
taken a di↵erent approach here. Those earlier arguments construe economics as a disci-
pline that should deliver more than a theory of (economic) choice (providing an account
of, e.g., some psychological features of agents, normatively relevant features beyond re-
vealed preferences, or non-circular explanations of choice). This premise is not shared
by those economists who, when pressed, are prepared to ‘define’ (micro-)economics as a
science of choice behaviour. Such a science should be as free as possible from normative
assumptions and play no ‘therapeutic’ role, in Gul and Pesendorfer’s terms. Critics of
behaviourism who presuppose a broader definition of the discipline have little hope of
convincing those who endorse the narrow, choice-centered definition. By contrast, our
critique should convince also those who view economics as a science of choice behaviour
alone, devoid of any further psychological or normative goals. Our naturalistic argument
shows that even if one is not interested in mental states as such, one’s theory of choice
may well have to take them on board. A theory of choice may have to be a theory about
more than choice.
Acknowledgements
This paper was presented at several occasions, including the LSE Choice Group workshop
on ‘Rationalizability and Choice’, July 2011, the D-TEA workshop, Paris, July 2012,
the EIPE seminar, Rotterdam, September 2012, the Paris Seminar on Economics and
Philosophy, July 2013, and the Rational Choice & Philosophy Conference, Vanderbilt
University, May 2014. We are grateful to the participants and especially Nick Baigent,
Walter Bossert, Richard Bradley, Mikae¨l Cozic, Eddie Dekel, Ido Erev, Itzhak Gilboa,
Conrad Heilmann, Johannes Himmelreich, Thomas Westho↵ Holaday, Marco Mariotti,
Friederike Mengel, Samir Okasha, Clemens Puppe, Larry Samuelson, David Schmeidler,
Asli Selim, Daniel Stoljar, Kotaro Suzumura, Peter Wakker, and John Weymark for
comments and discussion. We also thank two anonymous reviewers for their detailed and
helpful suggestions. Franz Dietrich was supported by a Ludwig Lachmann Fellowship
at the LSE and the French Agence Nationale de la Recherche (ANR-12-INEG-0006-
01). Christian List was supported by a Leverhulme Major Research Fellowship and the
Franco-Swedish Program in Philosophy and Economics.
29
References
Aumann, R. and A. Brandenburger. 1995. Epistemic Conditions for Nash Equilibrium.
Econometrica 63(5): 1161–1180.
Be´nabou, R. and J. Tirole. 2003. Intrinsic and Extrinsic Motivation. Review of Eco-
nomic Studies 70: 489–520.
Bennett, M., D. Dennett, P. Hacker and J. Searle. 2007. Neuroscience and Philosophy.
New York: Columbia University Press.
Bermudez, J. L. 2009. Decision Theory and Rationality. Oxford: Oxford University
Press.
Bhattacharyya, A., P. K. Pattanaik and Y. Xu. 2011. Choice, Internal Consistency and
Rationality. Economics and Philosophy 27(2): 123–149.
Block, N. 1980. What is Functionalism? In Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, vol.
1, ed. N. Block, 171–184. Cambridge/MA: Harvard University Press.
Bossert, W. and K. Suzumura. 2009. External Norms and Rationality of Choice. Eco-
nomics and Philosophy 25: 139-152.
Bossert, W. and K. Suzumura. 2010. Consistency, Choice, and Rationality. Cam-
bridge/MA: Harvard University Press.
Brennan, G. and P. Pettit. 2005. The Economy of Esteem. Oxford: Oxford University
Press.
Bricker, P. 2014. Ontological Commitment. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Win-
ter 2014 Edition), E. N. Zalta (ed.), URL:
<http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2014/entries/ontological-commitment/>.
Camerer, C. F., G. Loewenstein and D. Prelec. 2005. Neuroeconomics: How Neuro-
science Can Inform Economics. Journal of Economic Literature 43(1): 9–64.
Camerer, C. F., G. Loewenstein and M. Rabin. 2004. Advances in Behavioral Eco-
nomics. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Caplin, A. and A. Schotter, eds. 2008. The Foundations of Positive and Normative
Economics. Oxford / New York: Oxford University Press.
30
Chakravartty, A. 2014. Scientific Realism. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
(Spring 2014 Edition), E. N. Zalta (ed.), URL:
<http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2014/entries/scientific-realism/>.
Chalmers, D. 2010. The Character of Consciousness. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Cherepanov, V., T. Feddersen and A. Sandroni. 2013. Rationalization. Theoretical
Economics 8: 775–800.
Chomsky, N. 1959. A Review of B. F. Skinner’s Verbal Behavior. Language 35(1):
26–58.
Conradt, L. and C. List, eds. 2009. Group decision making in humans and animals.
Theme issue of Philosophical Tansactions of the Royal Society B 364: 717–852.
Cozic, M. 2012. Economie ‘sans esprit’ et donne´es cognitives. Working paper, Institut
d’Histoire et de Philosophie des Sciences et des Techniques, Paris.
Craver, C. F. and A. Alexandrova. 2008. No Revolution Necessary: Neural Mechanisms
for Economics. Economics and Philosophy 24(3): 381–406.
Davidson, D. 1973. Radical Interpretation. Dialectica 27(3–4): 313–328.
Dennett, D. 1987. The Intentional Stance. Cambridge/MA: MIT Press.
Dietrich, F. 2012. Modelling change in individual characteristics: an axiomatic frame-
work. Games and Economic Behavior 76: 471–494.
Dietrich, F. and C. List. 2013a. A reason-based theory of rational choice. Nous 47(1):
104–134.
Dietrich, F. and C. List. 2013b. Where do preferences come from? International Journal
of Game Theory 42(3): 613–637.
Dietrich, F. and C. List. 2015. Reason-based choice and context-dependence: An ex-
planatory framework. Working paper, LSE.
Edwards, J. M. 2008. On Behaviorism, Introspection, Psychology and Economics.
Working paper, University of Paris 1, Panthe´on-Sorbonne.
Elster, J. 1998. Emotions and Economic Theory. Journal of Economic Literature 36(1):
47–74.
31
Fine, A. 1984. The Natural Ontological Attitude. In Philosophy of Science, ed. J.
Leplin, 261–277. Berkeley: University of California Press.
Fodor, J. A. 1974. Special sciences (or: The disunity of science as a working hypothesis.
Synthese 28(2): 97–115.
Fodor, J. A. 1975. The Language of Thought. Cambridge/MA: Harvard University
Press.
Geanakoplos, J. and D. Pearce. 1989. Psychological games and sequential rationality.
Games and Economic Behavior 1(1): 60–79.
Gigerenzer, G., P. M. Todd and the ABC Research Group. 2000. Simple Heuristics
That Make Us Smart. New York: Oxford University Press.
Graham, G. 2010. Behaviorism. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
(Fall 2010 Edition), E. N. Zalta (ed.), URL:
<http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2010/entries/behaviorism/>.
Gul, F. and W. Pesendorfer. 2008. The Case for Mindless Economics. In The Foun-
dations of Positive and Normative Economics, ed. A. Caplin and A. Schotter, 3–39.
Oxford / New York: Oxford University Press.
Harre´, R. 1970. The principles of scientific thinking. London: Macmillan.
Harrison, G. W. 2008. Neuroeconomics: A Critical Reconsideration. Economics and
Philosophy 24(3): 303–344.
Harsanyi, J. C. 1955. Cardinal Welfare, Individualistic Ethics, and Interpersonal Com-
parisons of Utility. Journal of Political Economy 63(4): 309–321.
Hausman, D. 1998. Problems with Realism in Economics. Economics and Philosophy
14: 185–213.
Hausman, D. 2000. Revealed Preference, Belief, and Game Theory. Economics and
Philosophy 16: 99–115.
Hausman, D. 2008. Mindless or Mindful Economics: A Methodological Evaluation.
In The Foundations of Positive and Normative Economics, ed. A. Caplin and A.
Schotter, 125–151. Oxford / New York: Oxford University Press.
Hylton, P. 2007. Quine. Abingdon: Routledge.
32
Katz, J. J. 1964. Mentalism in Linguistics. Language 40(2): 124–137.
Ko˝szegi, B. and M. Rabin. 2007. Mistakes in Choice-Based Welfare Analysis. American
Economic Review 97(2): 477–481.
Langendoen, D. T. 1998. Bloomfield. In The MIT Encyclopedia of Cognitive Science,
ed. R. A. Wilson and F. C. Keil, 90–91. Cambridge/MA: MIT Press.
Lewis, D. 1983. Philosophical Papers Volume I. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
List, C. 1999. Craig’s Theorem and the Empirical Underdetermination Thesis Re-
assessed. Disputatio 7: 28–39.
List, C. 2003. Are Interpersonal Comparisons of Utility Indeterminate? Erkenntnis 58:
229–260.
List, C. and P. Menzies. 2009. Non-reductive physicalism and the limits of the exclusion
principle. Journal of Philosophy 106(9): 475–502.
List, C. 2014. Free will, determinism, and the possibility of doing otherwise. Nous
48(1): 156–178.
List, C. and P. Pettit. 2011. Group Agency: The Possibility, Design, and Status of
Corporate Agents. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
List, C. and K. Spiekermann. 2013. Methodological Individualism and Holism in Polit-
ical Science: A Reconciliation. American Political Science Review 107(4): 629–643.
Loewenstein, G. 2000. Emotions in Economic Theory and Economic Behavior. Ameri-
can Economic Review 90(2): 426–432.
Mandler, M., P. Manzini and M. Mariotti. 2012. A million answers to twenty questions:
Choosing by checklist. Journal of Economic Theory 147: 71–92.
Manzini, P. and M. Mariotti. 2007. Sequentially Rationalizable Choice’, American
Economic Review 97(5): 1824–1839.
Manzini, P. and M. Mariotti. 2012. Moody choice. Working paper, University of St
Andrews.
Maxwell, G. 1962. On the Ontological Status of Theoretical Entities. In Scientific Ex-
planation, Space, and Time; Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Volume
III, ed. H. Feigl and G. Maxwell, 3–27. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
33
Mongin, P. 2011. La the´orie de la de´cision et la psychologie du sens commun. Social
Science Information 50(3–4): 351–374.
Monton, B. and C. Mohler. 2014. Constructive Empiricism. Stanford Encyclopedia of
Philosophy (Spring 2014 Edition), E. N. Zalta (ed.), URL:
<http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2014/entries/constructive-empiricism/>.
Moore, J. 2001. On Distinguishing Methodological from Radical Behaviorism. European
Journal of Behavior Analysis 2: 221–244.
Musgrave, A. 1989. Noa’s Ark – Fine for Realism. The Philosophical Quarterly 39(157):
383–398.
Okasha, S. Forthcoming. On the Interpretation of Decision Theory. Manuscript, Bristol
University.
Pettit, P. 1991. Decision Theory and Folk Psychology. In Foundations of Decision
Theory: Issues and Advances, ed. M. Bacharach and S. Hurley, 147–175. Oxford:
Blackwell.
Pinker, S. 1994. The Language Instinct: How the Mind Creates Language. New York:
William Morrow.
Psillos, S. 1999. Scientific Realism: How Science Tracks Truth. Abingdon: Routledge.
Putnam, H. 1975. Philosophy and our mental life. In Mind, Language and Reality.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Quine, W. V. 1948. On What There Is. Review of Metaphysics 2: 21–38.
Quine, W. V. 1960. Word and Object. Cambridge/MA: MIT Press.
Quine, W. V. 1975. On Empirically Equivalent Systems of the World. Erkenntnis 9:
313–328.
Richter, M. K. 1966. Revealed Preference Theory. Econometrica 34(3): 635–645.
Romer, P. M. 2000. Thinking and Feeling. American Economic Review 90(2): 439–443.
Samuelson, P. 1938. A Note on the Pure Theory of Consumer’s Behaviour. Economica
(New Series) 5(17): 61–71.
Sen, A. K. 1971. Choice Functions and Revealed Preference. Review of Economic
Studies 38(3): 307–317.
34
Sen, A. K. 1977. Rational Fools: A Critique of the Behavioral Foundations of Economic
Theory. Philosophy and Public A↵airs 6(4): 317–344.
Sen, A. K. 1993. Internal Consistency of Choice. Econometrica 61(3): 495–521.
Shapere, D. 1982. The Concept of Observation in Science and Philosophy. Philosophy
of Science 49(4): 485–525.
Simon, H. A. 1956. Rational choice and the structure of the environment. Psychological
Review 63(2): 129–138.
Sober, E. 1999. The Multiple Realizability Argument against Reductionism. Philosophy
of Science 66(4): 542–564.
Suzumura, K. and Y. Xu. 2001. Characterizations of Consequentialism and Nonconse-
quentialism. Journal of Economic Theory 101(2): 423–436.
Tomasello, M. 1995. Language is Not an Instinct. Cognitive Development 10: 131–156.
van Fraassen, B. C. 1980. The Scientific Image. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Wakker, P. 2010. Prospect Theory: For Risk and Ambiguity. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press.
Weymark, J. A. 1991. A reconsideration of the Harsanyi–Sen debate on utilitarianism.
In Interpersonal Comparisons of Well-being, ed. J. Elster and J. E. Roemer, 255–320.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Woodward, J. 2011. Scientific Explanation. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Win-
ter 2011 Edition), E. N. Zalta (ed.), URL:
<http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2011/entries/scientific-explanation/>.
35
